In this paper, we propose a new concept of secure list decoding. While the conventional list decoding requires that the list contains the transmitted message, secure list decoding requires the following additional security conditions. The first additional security condition is the impossibility of the correct decoding, i.e., the receiver cannot uniquely identify the transmitted message even though the transmitted message is contained in the list. This condition can be trivially satisfied when the transmission rate is larger than the channel capacity. The other additional security condition is the impossibility for the sender to estimate another element of the decoded list except for the transmitted message. This protocol can be used for anonymous auction, which realizes the anonymity for bidding.
I. INTRODUCTION
Independently by Elias [1] and Wozencraft [2] as relaxation of the notion of the decoding process, list decoding was introduced as the method to allow more than one element as candidates of the message sent by the encoder in the decoder. When one of these elements coincides with the true message, the decoding is regarded as successful. In this formulation, Nishimura [3] obtained the channel capacity by showing its strong converse part 1 . That is, he showed that the transmission rate is less than the conventional capacity plus the rate of the list size, i.e., the number of list elements. Then, the reliable transmission rate does not increase even when list decoding is allowed if the list size does not increase exponentially. In the non-exponential case, these results were generalized by Ahlswede [4] . Further, the paper [5] showed that the upper bound of capacity by Nishimura can be attained even if the list size increases exponentially. However, the merit of increase in the list size was not discussed sufficiently.
In this paper, we propose a new concept of secure list decoding. To explain this protocol, we consider the following anonymous auction scenario, which realizes the anonymity for bidding. M players participate in the auction for an item dealt by Bob, and they have their distinct ID from 1 to M. (ii) (Purchasing) Assume that Alice's bidding price is highest. She purchases the item from Bob by showing her ID M .
This scenario has the following requirements.
(a) Bob wants to identify whether the person to purchase the item is the same as the person to bid the highest price. That is, M needs to be one of
Alice wants to hide her ID M at the bidding step (i). Hence, she will not be identified by Bob when she loses this auction.
(c)
Bob wants to avoid the situation that two players show him the correct ID at purchasing Step (ii). That is, Alice cannot find another element among M 1 , . . . , M L except for M .
The requirement (a) is the condition for the requirement for the conventional list decoding while the requirements (b) and (c) are not considered in the conventional list decoding. In this paper, as a new concept to satisfy these conditions, we propose secure list decoding by imposing the following two additional conditions to the list decoding. The first additional security condition is the impossibility of the correct decoding. That is, the receiver cannot uniquely identify the transmitted message even though the transmitted message is contained in the list. This condition can be trivially satisfied when the transmission rate is larger than the channel capacity due to the strong converse property. The other additional security condition is the impossibility for the sender to estimate another element of the decoded list except for the transmitted message. In fact, we might use an authentication protocol to identify Alice [6] . In this case, if Alice gives the key for the authentication to the third party, the third party can claim to Bob that he is also the winner of this auction. To avoid this type of spoofing, we need to use the ID number. That is, the above anonymous auction scenario realizes a kind of authentication, which satisfies the anonymity and forbids spoofing even when Alice colludes the third party.
In this paper, we formulate secure list decoding, and define various types of capacity regions for secure list decoding. Then, we calculate these capacity regions under some condition.
This paper is structured as follows. Section II-A gives the formulation of secure list decoding. Section II-B explains the relation with bit commitment. Section IV prepares several information quantities. Section IV states the main result by deriving the capacity regions. Section V shows the converse part. The main theorem for the direct part is shown in [16] .
II. PROBLEM SETTING

A. Our setting
To realize the requirements (a), (b), and (c) mentioned in Section I, given a channel W from the discrete system X to the other system Y, we consider the following protocol with integers L < M and security parameters A , δ B , δ C . For x ∈ X and a distribution on X , we define the distribution W x and W P on Y as W x (y) := W (y|x) and W P (y) := x∈X P (x)W (y|x). Alice sends her ID M ∈ M := {1, . . . , M} via noisy channel W with a code φ, which is a map from M to X . Bob recovers the L messages M 1 , . . . M L . The decoder is given by disjoint subsets D = {D m1,...,mL } {m1,...,mL}⊂M such that ∪ {m1,...,mL}⊂M D m1,...,mL = Y. Then, we impose the following conditions.
(A) Verifiable condition.
In this paper, when a decoder has only one outcome as an element of M like {D m } m∈M , it is called a single-element decoder. (C) Non-cheating condition for honest Alice.
where δ C,m (x, D)
Now, we discuss how the code (φ, D) can be used for the task explained in Section I. Assume that Alice sends her ID M to Bob by using the encoder φ via noisy channel W and Bob gets the list M 1 , . . . , M L by applying the decoder D as Step (i). At Step (ii), Alice shows her ID M to Bob. Verifiable condition (A) guarantees that M belongs to Bob's list. Hence, the requirement (a) is satisfied. Non-decodable condition (B) forbids Bob to identify Alice's ID at Step (i), hence it guarantees the requirement (b). In fact, if m is Alice's ID and there exists an element x 0 = m such that δ C,m (x 0 , D)
is close to 1, Alice can make the following cheating. Since Alice knows that x 0 belongs to Bob's decoded list, she finds the third person whose ID is x 0 . Then, she tells the third person this fact. At Step (ii), the third person can make spoofing by showing Bob his/her ID. Since Non-cheating condition (C) forbids Alice such a cheating, it guarantees the requirement (c). Further, Bob is allowed to decode messages less than L. That is, L is the maximum number that Bob can list as the candidates of the original message.
However, Condition (C) is the security evaluation for honest Alice who uses the correct encoder φ. Dishonest Alice might send her message by using a different encoder. To cover such a case, we impose the following condition instead of Condition (C).
(D) Non-cheating condition for dishonest Alice.
In the following, when a code (φ, D) satisfies conditions
B. Relation to bit commitment
If our task is realized and M = F l 2 , we can approximately realize bit commitment as follows while it is known that bit commitment can be realized by using noisy channel [7] , [8] , [9] .
Assume that we have a ( A , δ B , δ C ) code (φ, D) with sufficiently small security parameters A , δ B , δ C . Then, X, M , and Y are variables given in Section II-A with the code (φ, D). Also, we assume that M is subject to the uniform distribution on M = F l 2 . Since Bob cannot identify M , we have H(M |Y ) ≥ − log δ B [10, Theorem 1][11, Lemma 5.9]. First, to choose a function f from M to F 2 . We choose surjective homomorphic universal hash function F from M to F 2 [13] . Then, the universal2 hash lemma [12] , [14] , [15] guarantees that
Alice has bit X = 0 or 1. Then, Alice randomly generates messages M ∈ f −1 (X). Then, Alice sends M to Bob via the above protocol in the binding phase. In the opening phase, Alice shows M to Bob. Bob calculates f (M ) and finds the value of X. If M does not belong to Bob's decoded message list, Bob considers that Alice makes cheating.
In this scenario, if Alice wants to make cheating, in the opening phase, she has to find another message M ∈ f −1 (X ⊕ 1) such that M belongs to Bob's decoder's list. However, it is impossible due to Condition (D). Hence, the bit commitment is realized from the code for secure list decoding.
III. INFORMATION QUANTITIES
Consider the channel written as the transition matrix W from X to Y. For x ∈ X and a distribution on X , we define the distribution W x and W P on Y as X x (y) := W (y|x) and W P (y) := x∈X P (x)W (y|x). E x expresses the average with respect to a variable over the system Y under the distribution W x and V x expresses the variance with respect to a variable over the system Y under the distribution W x . This notation is also applied to the n-fold extended setting.
We define
where the base of logarithm is 2. For x, x ∈ X , we define
Then, we define
In the following, we assume that
IV. MAIN RESULTS
A. Capacity regions
To give the capacity region, we consider n-fold discrete memoryless extension W n of the channel W . A sequence of codes {(φ n , D n )} is called strongly secure when
is strongly deterministically (stochastically) achievable when there exists a strongly secure sequence of deterministic (stochastic) codes
is weakly deterministically (stochastically) achievable when there exists a weakly secure sequence of deterministic (stochastic) codes {(φ n , D n )} such that 1 n log |(φ n , D n )| 1 → R 1 and 1 n log |(φ n , D n )| 2 → R 2 . Then, we denote the set of strongly deterministically (stochastically) achievable rate pair (R 1 , R 2 ) by R s,d (R s,s ). In the same way, we denote the set of weakly deterministically (stochastically) achievable rate pair (R 1 , R 2 ) by R w,d (R w,s ).
Theorem 1:
Theorem 2: A rate pair (R 1 , R 2 ) is achievable when there exists a distribution P on X such that ζ 1 (P ) > 0 and
In fact, the condition R 1 − R 2 < I(P, W ) corresponds to Verifiable condition (A), the condition I(P, W ) < R 1 does to Non-decodable condition (B), and the conditions R 1 < H(P ) and ζ 1 (P ) > 0 do to Non-cheating condition for dishonest Alice (D). Theorem 1 is shown in Section V. Section VI gives a sketch of the proof of Theorem 2. We have the following corollaries from Theorem 2, whose detailed derivations are given in Section IV-B.
Corollary 1: When any distribution P with support X satisfies the condition ζ 1 (P ) > 0, we have
Corollary 2: Assume that there is no distinct pair (x, x ) in X such that W x = W x . Also, we assume that there exists P 0 such that C(W ) = I(P 0 , W ) and supp(P 0 ) = X . Then, we have
Combining Corollary 1 with Theorem 1 (Converse part), we have the capacity regions as follows. Corollary 3: When any distribution P with support X satisfies the condition ζ 1 (P ) > 0,
Notice that when |X | = 2, any distribution P satisfies the condition ζ 1 (P ) > 0, i.e., D(W
. Hence, we have the capacity region.
B. Derivations of corollaries
First, we prepare the following lemma. Lemma 1: Given a joint distribution P XU , we have the Markov chain U − X − Y , which gives the information quantities I(X; Y |U ) and H(X|U ). Then, we have
Proof: Since the relation ⊂ is trivial, it is sufficient to the relation ⊃. That is, given a distribution P XU and the pair
There exists a distribution P XU such that I(X; Y |U ) = 0. There exists a convex combination P XU of P XU and P XU such that I(X; Y |U ) < R 1 < H(X|U ). Thus, the desired statement is shown.
Proof of Corollary 1: Assume that two sequences {(φ n , D n )} and {(φ n , D n )} of deterministic codes are strongly secure. Then, we define the concatenation {(φ 2n , D 2n )} as follows. When φ n (φ n ) is given as a map from M(M ) to X n , the encoder φ 2n is given as a map from (m, m ) ∈ M × M to (φ n (m), φ n (m )) ∈ X 2n . The decoder D 2n is given as a map from (y 1 , . . . , y 2n ) ∈ Y 2n to (D n (y 1 , . . . , y n ), D n (y n+1 , . . . , y 2n )) ∈ M L × M L . We
is correctly decoded when both codes (φ n , D n ) and (φ n , D n ) are correctly decoded. Since the message encoded by φ 2n is correctly decoded only when both messages encoded by encoders φ n and φ n are correctly decoded, we have δ B (φ 2n ) ≤ min(δ B (φ n ), δ B (φ n )). Alice can make cheating for the decoder D 2n only when Alice makes cheating for one of the decoders D n and D n . Hence, δ D (D 2n ) ≤ min(δ D (D n ), δ D (D n )). Therefore, the concatenation {(φ 2n , D 2n )} is also strongly secure. Since any distribution P satisfies the condition of Theorem 2, using the concatenated code given in Theorem 2, we find that
The combination of Eq. (16) and Lemma 1 implies Theorem 1. Proof of Corollary 2: Since D(W x W P ) = D(W x W P ), we have
Hence, Theorem 2 implies Eq. (15).
V. PROOF OF CONVERSE THEOREM
We prepare the following lemma. Lemma 2: For X n = (X 1 , . . . , X n ), we choose the joint distribution P X n . Let Y n = (Y 1 , . . . , Y n ) be the channel output variables of the inputs X n via the channel W . Then, we have
Proof of Theorem 1: Assume that a sequence of deterministic codes {(φ n , D n )} is weakly secure. We assume that R i := lim n→∞ 1 n log |(φ n , D n )| i converges for i = 1, 2.
Letting M be the random variable of the message, we define the variables X n = (X 1 , . . . , X n ) := φ n (M ). The random variables Y n = (Y 1 , . . . , Y n ) are defined as the output of the channel W n , which is the n times use of the channel W . We define the joint distribution P XU |n by P XU |n (x, i) := 1 n P Xi (x). Under the distribution P XU |n , we denote the channel output by Y . Then, we have I(X; Y |U ) and H(X|U ). When we need to describe the dependence of n, we denote them by I n (X; Y |U ) and H n (X|U ). In this proof, we use the notations M n := |(φ n , D n )| 1 and L n := |(φ n , D n )| 2 . Also, instead of A (φ n , D n ), we employ
For a code (φ n , D n ), we have
where (b) follows from Lemma 2. Dividing the above by n and taking the limit, we have
To show (a) in (19), we consider the following protocol. After converting the message M to X n by the encoder φ n (M ), Alice sends the X n to Bob K times. Here, we choose K to be an arbitrary large integer. Applying the decoder D n , Bob obtains K lists that contain up to L K messages. Among these messages, Bob choosesM as the element that most frequently appears in the K lists. When δ C (φ n , D n ) < 1 − A,M (φ n (M ), D n ) and K is sufficiently large, Bob can correctly decode M by this method because 1 − A,M (φ n (M ), D n ) is the probability that the list contains M and δ C (φ n , D n ) is the maximum of the probability that the list contains m = M , i.e., the element M has the highest probability to be contained in the list. Therefore, the failure of decoding is limited to the case when 1 − δ C (φ n , D n ) ≤ A,M (φ n (M ), D n ), Since the average of A,M (φ n (M ), D n ) is A (φ n , D n ), Markov inequality guarantees that the error probability of this protocol is bounded by := A (φn,Dn) 1−δC (φn,Dn) . Fano inequality shows that H(M |M ) ≤ log |(φ n , D n )| 1 + log 2. Then, we have
which implies (a) in (19). Now, we consider the hypothesis testing with two distributions P (m, y n ) := 1 Mn W n (y n |φ n (m)) and Q(m, y n ) := 1 Mn Mn m=1 W n (y n |φ n (m)) on M n × Y n , where M n := {1, . . . , M n }. Then, we define the region D * n ⊂ M n × Y n as ∪ m1,...,mL n {m 1 , . . . , m Ln } × D m1,...,mL n . Using the the region D * n as our test, we define Q as the error probability to incorrectly support P while the true is Q. Also, we define P as the error probability to incorrectly support Q while the true is P . When we apply the monotonicity for the KL divergence between P and Q, dropping the term P log(1 − Q ), we have
The meta converse for list decoding [5, Section III-A] shows that Q ≤ |(φn,Dn)|2 |(φn,Dn)|1 and P = A (φ n , D n ). Since Lemma 2 guarantees that D(P Q) = I(X n ; Y n ) ≤ nI n (X; Y |U ), the relation (21) is converted to
Dividing the above by n and taking the limit, we have
Therefore, combining Eqs. (20) and (23), we obtain Eq. (12) . Assume that a sequence of stochastic codes {(φ n , D n )} is strongly secure. Then, there exists a sequence of deterministic encoders {φ n } such that A (φ n , D n ) ≤ A (φ n , D n ) and δ C (φ n , D n ) ≤ δ D (D n ). Since A (φ n , D n ) → 0 and δ C (φ n , D n ) → 0, combining Eq. (12), we have Eq. (13).
VI. SKETCH OF PROOF OF DIRECT THEOREM
Our proof of Theorem 2 is essentially based on the random coding while the full proof is given in [16] . Hence, to briefly explain the idea of our proof, we give the decoder D φn for a given encoder φ n on X n , here. First, we fix a distribution P on X , the list size L n , and a number M n , which is smaller than M n . We define the subset D x n := {y n |W x n (y n ) ≥ M n W ×n P (y n )}. Then, for y n ∈ Y n , we choose up to L n elements i 1 , . . . , i L n (L n ≤ L n ) as the decoded messages such that y n ∈ D φn(ij ) for j = 1, . . . , L n .
VII. CONCLUSION
We have proposed a new concept, secure list decoding, which has additional requirements for the conventional list decoding. This scheme has three requirements. Verifiable condition, Non-decodable condition, and Non-cheating condition. Non-cheating condition has two versions. One is the condition for honest Alice (sender). The other is the condition for dishonest Alice. Since there is a possibility that Alice uses a different code, we need to guarantee the impossibility of cheating even for such a dishonest Alice. In this paper, we have shown the existence of a code to satisfy these three conditions. Also, we have defined the capacity region as the possible rate pair of the rates of the message and the list, and have derived the capacity region under a proper condition. Also, we have constructed a protocol for bit commitment from the secure list decoding. However, it is not trivial to construct secure list decoding from bit commitment. This direction is an interesting open problem.
